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Promoting Employee Policy Adherence
and Rule Following in Work Settings

THE VALUE OF SELF-REGULATORY APPROACHES

*

Tom R. Tyler†
ABSTRACT
Securing employee adherence to work-place rules and
company policies is one key antecedent of successful
coordination and functioning within organizations. It is
important for companies to be able to motivate effectively rulefollowing behavior among employees. This analysis highlights
the value of identifying optimal approaches to securing such
behavior. In this paper, two strategies for achieving policy
adherence and rule following are compared. Those strategies
are: (1) the sanction-based command-and-control model and (2)
self-regulatory approaches that are linked to activating
employees’ ethical judgments. Research findings suggest that,
while command-and-control strategies influence employee
*
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behavior, self-regulatory strategies have a stronger influence.
Studies also explore the basis of these ethical judgments and
find that the primary factor shaping them is the procedural
justice that employees experience in their workplace. These
results suggest that the roots of employee policy adherence and
rule-following behavior lie in the procedural justice of the
organization. Overall, this analysis highlights the important
role ethical judgments play in motivating both rule following
and policy adherence among employees in work settings and
provides practical suggestions for shaping those judgments.
INTRODUCTION: CAN BUSINESSES EFFECTIVELY REGULATE
EMPLOYEE CONDUCT?: THE ANTECEDENTS OF RULE ADHERENCE IN
WORK SETTINGS
Can businesses effectively engage in the internal
regulation of employee behavior, and if so, what strategies
should they use to achieve best that objective? Recent corporate
scandals have evoked a heightened concern among members of
the public, government officials, and business leaders both
about whether businesses can regulate the conduct of their
employees and how to secure effectively employee adherence to
corporate rules and policies. Such adherence is important in a
wide variety of work settings and involves organizational
policies that cover, among other things, accurate accounting,
conflicts of interest, product or service quality, environmental
safety, sexual harassment, and race, gender and/or sexual
orientation discrimination. In these and many other ways,
gaining adherence to organizational policies that control
everyday employee behavior is critical for successful
organizational functioning.1
Unfortunately, there has long been extensive evidence
that in many of these areas noncompliance within
organizations is widespread.2 Such issues of compliance and
1

See Myrtle P. Bell et al., Discrimination, Harassment, and the Glass
Ceiling: Women Executives as Change Agents, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 65, 65-76 (2002);
William S. Laufer & Diana C. Robertson, Corporate Ethics Initiatives as Social Control,
16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1029, 1029-48 (1997).
2
See Mike Healy & Jennifer Iles, The Establishment and Enforcement of
Codes, 39 J. BUS. ETHICS 117, 117-24 (2002); Joel Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental
Enforcement, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 127, 127-48 (2001).; Eric M. Rice, The
Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corporations, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 125, 125-61 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); DAVID R. SIMON & D. STANLEY
EITZEN, ELITE DEVIANCE passim (3d ed. 1990); David B. Spence, The Shadow of the
Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law,
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noncompliance have been dramatically thrust into the public
eye through recent highly-visible incidents of corporate
misconduct. The prevalence and damaging consequences of
such non-compliance underscores the importance of identifying
an effective model of employee rule adherence. Businesses
would benefit from such a model since it would allow them to
shape employee conduct in desirable ways. Further, from a
policy perspective, government agencies are more likely to feel
that the active regulation of businesses is important if they
believe that businesses lack an effective model for selfregulation.
Of course, it is also important to recognize that a wide
variety of other issues are implicated in recent corporate
scandals. In particular, in some cases the problem is linked to
misbehavior among corporate leaders—i.e., CEOs. The focus of
this paper is not on the leaders of corporations, but on
employees within them. In particular, this paper does not
consider the case in which leaders are creating an unethical
climate within their companies so that they can break rules for
personal profit. Rather, this paper begins with the assumption
that the situation can be one in which the leaders of a company
are motivated to encourage their employees to follow rules and
are seeking to understand how best to do so.
Similarly, from the perspective of the law and legal
institutions, this analysis assumes that legal authorities are
interested in motivating employees to follow the law and are
trying to understand the strategies that companies should be
encouraged to follow to achieve this objective. In this case, the
arguments outlined may well apply to corporate leaders as well
as employees. Legal authorities need to create a strategy that
will motivate corporate leaders to follow the law, and the
arguments outlined here apply directly to that task.
I.

BACKGROUND

My goal is to compare the utility of two approaches to
employee regulation: the command-and-control model and the
self-regulatory model. The command-and-control model
represents a traditional approach to encouraging rule following
insofar as it operates by drawing upon employees’ instrumental
concerns and utility-maximization goals. Specifically, the
89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 917-98 (2001); YOAV VARDI & ELY WEITZ, MISBEHAVIOR IN
ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 3-4 (2004).
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command-and-control model links employees’ motivation to
follow rules to the manipulation of sanctions in the work place.
It is based on the view that people follow rules as a function of
the costs and benefits they associate with doing so.
The command-and-control model reflects a strategy of
external regulation whereby employee behavior is controlled by
managers through their ability to implement sanctions and to
punish undesired behavior. In contrast, the self-regulatory
model is based upon the activation of internal motivations. This
distinction develops from prior social-psychological research,3
which distinguishes between compliance based upon external
contingencies and self-regulation linked to identification and
internalization.4 The self-regulatory model represents an
alternative approach to employee rule following. The model
emphasizes the role that employees’ ethical values play in
motivating rule following and, in particular, those ethical
values that are related to—and developed in the course of
interactions with—their work organization. That is, I focus on
those ethical judgments that are linked to employees’ specific
experiences at their work organizations. This can be contrasted
to a focus on individual differences in ethical judgments—i.e.,
to those aspects of people’s personalities that shape how they
judge particular ethical matters. My focus on organizationallybased ethical judgments is rooted in an interest in determining
the characteristics of work environments—as opposed to
individuals—that may shape employee rule following. This
emphasis has the potential to be of particular utility to leaders
and managers in their attempts to design workplace
environments that foster rule-following among employees.
Two specific ethical judgments that are linked to
organizational conditions are considered here: (1) the perceived
legitimacy of organizational rules and authorities and (2) the
congruence of those rules with an employee’s moral values. The
self-regulatory model argues that the concerns embodied in
these two ethical judgments have the potential to motivate
employees to feel a personal responsibility for bringing their
behavior into line with corporate rules and policies. It is based
3

See Herbert C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification, and Internalization
Three Processes of Attitude Change, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 51, 53 (1958).
4
This distinction is extended to organizational arenas, HERBERT C. KELMAN
& V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 103-12 (1989) and to work settings,
Charles A. O’Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Organizational Commitment and
Psychological Attachment, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 492, 492-99 (1986).
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on the assumption that people are motivated to align their
behavior with the rules of organizations or groups they belong
to when they view those groups as being legitimate and
consistent with their own sense of right and wrong.
The first goal of this analysis is to compare the relative
efficacy of the two distinct strategies outlined. While the use of
sanctions represents a traditional management strategy to
securing employee compliance with organizational rules and
policies, I consider recent studies that directly examine
whether activating employees’ ethical values is an effective
management strategy for securing their compliance. The use of
such a self-regulatory model has been long advocated within
discussions of legal regulation of business,5 and has been
advanced with particular frequency in recent years.6 The
studies examined test whether employees’ ethical values can in
reality—as hypothesized by self-regulatory models—provide a
viable basis for encouraging employee policy adherence.
The second goal of this paper is to examine the
antecedents of employee ethical values. To the extent that the
self-regulatory model represents and describes an important
influence on employee policy adherence, it becomes important
to understand the factors that shape whether or not employees
come to hold ethical values that encourage such adherence.
Drawing upon the literature on procedural justice, it is
hypothesized that employees’ ethical values will be activated
and will be more salient in decision making when employees
evaluate their organization as being governed according to fair
procedures. This prediction is linked to one of the core
hypotheses of the group engagement model7: that procedural5

See generally PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE

(1969).
6

See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving
Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1198-1201, 1243-44
(1998); Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthagen, Moving Beyond Command and Control:
Reflexivity in the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment,
19 LAW AND POLICY 415, 415-43 (1997); John Darley et al., Enacting Justice: The
Interplay of Individual and Institutional Perspectives, 458, 458-476 in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds. 2003); Darren
Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False Dichotomies, 19
L. & POL. 529, 529-59 (1997); Mark Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and
Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 571-610 (1995); Tom R. Tyler,
Trust and Law-Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV.
361, 361-62 (2001).
7
See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 16 (2000);
Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L. Blader, Can Business Effectively Regulate Employee
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justice judgments are central to shaping employee cooperative
behavior. This procedural-justice hypothesis has been
supported by prior studies of rule following in legal8 and
managerial9 settings, although it has not received universal
support.10 If supported by research, this model provides a
theoretical perspective within which managers can develop a
strategy for activating employees’ ethical values in work
settings and thus secure employee compliance with work rules
and policies.
What are the behaviors we are interested in motivating
employees to engage in?
There are several frameworks within which to
conceptualize the ways in which employees may follow or break
organizational rules, and this study will examine each of them.
Two aspects of policy-related behavior are considered here:
policy adherence and rule breaking. On the one hand,
organizations want employees to adhere to organizational
policies. Organizational rules and policies stipulate desired
employee behavior, and the organization benefits when those
policies are followed. For example, organizational rules often
specify behaviors about how work should be carried out, when
people arrive at work, etc. Such rules facilitate coordination
between employees and ensure the smooth functioning of the
organization. This aspect of rule following involves conformity
to organizational policies since it encourages employees to align
their behavior with organizational rules.
I further distinguish between two forms of policyadherence behavior: conformity with organizational policies
and voluntary deference to organizational policies. The roots of
this distinction lie in the literature on obeying the law, which
distinguishes between compliance with the law and voluntary,
willing acceptance of the law.11 The same distinction is
important in work settings.12
Conduct?: The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, ACAD. MGMT. J.
(forthcoming 2005).
8
See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
9
See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 77-89.
10
See, e.g., K. Kuperan & Jon G. Sutinen, Blue Water Crime: Deterrence,
Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 309, 328 (1998).
11
See Kelman, supra note 3, at 51-60 (1958); TYLER, supra note 8; TOM R.
TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 47-76 (2002).
12
See O’Reilly & Chatman, supra note 4, at. 492-99.
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The distinction between these two forms of behavior lies
in the circumstances under which employees indicate that they
follow rules. In terms of compliance, people indicate how often
they follow the rules across all settings. With voluntary, willing
acceptance, on the other hand, they indicate whether they
follow the rules even when they do not have to, when no one is
around, and when their behavior is not being monitored. In
other words, when it comes to voluntary deference, people
choose to follow the rules even when failing to do so will not be
detected. Hence voluntary deference refers to rule following in
that subset of situations in which issues of detection are largely
or completely irrelevant.
On the flip side of conformity or deference to
organizational policies lies deviant behavior by employees, or
behaviors that are damaging and prohibited by organizational
rules. For example, employees may use office supplies for
personal use or use sick leave when not sick. More seriously,
employees may steal or break organizational rules by lying and
cheating. I refer to this deviant behavior as rule breaking
because it involves the decision to ignore or violate
organizational rules.
Naturally, companies want to reduce the degree of rule
breaking that occurs among employees. For instance, a widely
damaging form of inappropriate employee behavior is theft of
business supplies and equipment. It is estimated that 30% to
50% of all business failures are linked to losses from employee
theft, a problem that is ten times more costly than street crime
in terms of loss to society, and whose costs are often estimated
to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars in the United States
alone.13 Again, the magnitude of these losses, and the
suggestion that up to 75% of employees engage in theft in their
workplace, indicates the challenge posed in trying to manage
this problem.
II.

MODELS OF MOTIVATION AND POLICY ADHERENCE

Command-and-control.
The
command-and-control
perspective focuses on controlling people’s behavior via the
threat of punishments or sanctions for misbehavior. To the
degree that employees are motivated instrumentally—and are
13

See Jerald Greenberg, The STEAL Motive: Managing the Social
Determinants of Employee Theft, in ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS 85
(Robert Giacalone & Jerald Greenberg eds. 1997).
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thus primarily interested in the resources and outcomes they
receive from their organizations—some external authority,
either the company or the government, needs to take an active
role in enforcing rules regarding their conduct. In other words,
to the extent that employees are extrinsically motivated,
extrinsic forces are needed to regulate their behavior. In
organizational settings, such extrinsic forces typically take the
form of incentives (to encourage desired behavior) and
sanctions (to discourage undesirable behavior). Incentives and
sanctions in many ways represent two sides of the same
extrinsic motivational coin—each is an organizational
mechanism used to control employee behavior via employees’
concerns over the resources and benefits the organization
provides them. There is already discussion in the
organizational literature about problems with incentives,14 as
well as a parallel discussion regarding the potential
inadequacies and pitfalls of punishments as motivational
tools.15
Many of the features of the modern workplace are the
product of the use of command-and-control model. For example,
the extensive use of surveillance techniques—such as the use of
cameras, the monitoring of telephone calls and computer usage,
etc.—is an artifact of the implementation of command-andcontrol techniques. Random drug testing, searching employees’
cars and lockers, and the use of time clocks and other
performance-tracking devices similarly reflect the view that
compliance develops from a credible fear of detection and
This
instrumental
strategy
ensuing sanctions.

addresses the issue of employee motivation from the
perspective of traditional economic theory—i.e., by
assuming that employees are rational actors who are
concerned primarily about maximizing their own
16
outcomes in work settings. Studies generally support the
suggestion that instrumental strategies do, as expected,
shape people’s behavior,17 with some studies supporting
this argument in work settings.18
14

See generally ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS (1999).
See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY 80-82 (1997).
16
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2001).
17
See Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the
Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 12-23
15
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However, the use of instrumental strategies—and the
command-and-control strategy in particular—requires the
availability of resources. For sanctions and deterrence systems
to work, organizations must be able (and willing) to devote
significant resources to the surveillance needed to make
detection of rule breaking sufficiently likely so that people are
deterred. The cost of such surveillance should not be
underestimated, since employees are inherently motivated to
conceal their rule-breaking behavior and effective surveillance
systems are essential for sanctioning systems to shape
behavior. Incentive strategies do not have surveillance
problems, but require the availability of resources for
incentives as well as a system to define and evaluate
performance.
In addition to their financial costs to the organization,
there are also social costs associated with command-andcontrol systems. These systems have the potential to
communicate a message of mistrust in employees, conveying a
sense that the organization is an adversarial force to the
employee. Significant repercussions on employee commitment
and identification with the organization may thus result.
Furthermore, interpersonal dynamics may often be affected, as
employees that maintain surveillance systems are pit against
those being scrutinized.
Perhaps most importantly, it is also not clear how
effective command-and-control strategies are. For example, in
legal settings sanction-based deterrent strategies are
consistently found to have, at best, a minor influence on rulebreaking behavior.19 In his review of the deterrent effect of drug
laws, for example, MacCoun finds that only about five percent
of the variance in drug use is explained by deterrence factors.20
Based upon their workplace-based study, Tyler and Blader
(1998); Daniel Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Perceived
Risk of Arrest: Testing an Expanded Conception of Deterrence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561,
561-85 (1991); Raymond Paternoster, Decisions to Participate in and Desist From Four
Types of Common Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 7, 24-25 (1989); Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the
Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 173-217 (1987).
18
See Mark A. Huselid, The Impact of Human Resource Management
Practices on Turnover, Productivity, and Corporate Financial Performance, 38 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 635, 635-72 (1995); G. Douglas Jenkins et al., Are Financial Incentives
Related to Performance?, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 777, 777-87 (1998).
19
Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug
Prohibition, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 497-512 (1993); TYLER, supra note 8.
20
See generally MacCoun, supra note 19.
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estimate that around ten percent of the variance in employee
behavior is shaped by incentives in the work environment.21
These results suggest that, while such systems are somewhat
effective, they may only have a limited impact on employee
behavior.
More generally, in recent years the limits of the
command-and-control model have been noted.22 However, this
increasing skepticism has occurred within the arena of legal
regulation,23 and less so in discussions of work organizations.
Thus, the managerial relevance of these critiques remains an
open issue.
Of course, command-and-control strategies do not only
exist within organizations. Organizations also function within
a framework of government-imposed legal prohibitions and
administrative requirements that are also based on incentive
and sanction systems.24 Even at this more macro level, the
utility of those systems has been increasingly questioned. For
instance, they have been referred to as “ossified” systems that
make “compliance difficult and impractical.”25 An additional
difficulty often noted in this domain is the problem of
monitoring behavior.26 Within the legal literature on
government regulation, such skepticism about command-andcontrol strategies has lead to the flourishing of market-based
models of regulation that emphasize economic incentive
systems.27
21

See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 38-42.
See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Reference,
Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. REV. 1141 (1983); J.M. BRETT,
Commentary on Procedural Justice Papers, in NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS 165,
165-76 (Max H. Bazerman & Roy Lewicki eds., 1983); BRENT FISSE & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2416-20 (1997); Timothy F.
Malloy, Regulation and the Compliance Norm (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author); David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a
“Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1-30 (2000); Jon G. Sutinen & K. Kuperan, A Socio-Economic
Theory of Regulatory Compliance, 26 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 174, 174-93 (1999).
23
See TYLER & HUO, supra note 11, at 19-24.
24
See JONE L. PEARCE, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE EMBRACE OF
GOVERNMENT 12-14 (2001); STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY (5th ed. 2002); NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART
REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998).
25
See Spence, supra note 2, at 918.
26
See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 83-88 (2002).
27
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the 21st Century, Presentation
at New York University Law School (February 10, 2003).
22
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Self-regulation. An alternative model of employee policy
adherence is one in which the motivation to follow
organizational rules resides in the employees themselves and
not in extrinsic incentives or sanctions stipulated by the
organization. According to such a model, employees can be
intrinsically motivated to follow organizational rules—that is,
they will do so out of their own desires and not in response to
the regulations put in place by the organization to provide
sanctions for employee misbehavior and/or incentives for
desired employee behavior. The self-regulatory model tested in
these studies specifically examines the role of employees’
ethical values in shaping intrinsic motivation to follow rules.
The success of this approach depends upon the power of
employees’ ethical values to motivate their rule and policyfollowing behavior in the workplace.
Calls for greater attention to ethics in business school
curricula and for more attention to ethical issues in work
cultures flow from the belief that employees’ ethical values can
be developed and activated within work settings.28 This belief,
when combined with the assumption that ethical values can
have an important role in shaping behavior, thus argues for the
importance of corporate cultures that shape ethical values in
ways that promote employee policy adherence. That is, to the
extent that ethical values affect employee rule following, the
challenge is to create organizational cultures that harness the
motivational power of employees’ ethical values.
Several types of evidence suggest that ethical values
may shape employee behavior. Research suggests that ethical
concerns motivate self-regulatory behavior in organizational
settings.29 This includes studies focused on legitimacy,30 on

28

See NORMAN E. BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE (1999);
Schminke, 1998; LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 159-90 (2003).
29
See Aalders & Wilthagen, supra note 6, at 415-43); Neil Gunningham &
Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y
363, 363 (1997); Andrew A. King & Michael Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without
Sanctions, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 698-716 (2000); Rechtschaffen, supra note 6, at
1181-1272; Sinclair, supra note 6.
30
See Sherrie E. Human & Keith G. Provan, Legitimacy Building in the
Evolution of Small Firm Multilateral Networks: A Comparative Study of Success and
Demise, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 327, 327-65 (2000); Suchman, supra note 6, at 571-610;
TYLER, supra note 8; COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 57-64; Tyler & Blader,
supra note 7; Monica A. Zimmerman & Gerald J. Zeitz, Beyond Survival: Achieving
New Venture Growth by Building Legitimacy, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 414, 414-43 (2002).
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morality,31 and on the general role of fairness in shaping social
behavior.32 Ethical values that encourage people to support the
organization shape behavior when those people believe that the
rules of their organization are legitimate (and hence ought to
be obeyed) and/or that the values defining the organization are
more congruent with their own moral values.
There is evidence of the importance of ethical values at
the organizational level as well. Studies show that companies
are reluctant to use their market power to lower employee
wages during recessions because they believe such an action
will be viewed by employees as unethical,33 that companies
often forgo opportunities to press their market advantages
when dealing with their customers due to ethical concerns,34
and that ethical issues shape wage determinations35 as well as
other aspects of the employment relationship.36 These studies
argue that companies are motivated to respond to ethical
issues because they believe that ethical judgments shape
people’s reactions and behavior,37 an argument supported by
studies suggesting that companies regarded as ethical by
employees, customers, and other constituencies are more
profitable.38
I focus on the influence of two particular types of ethical
values. The first is the belief held by employees that their
organization’s rules and authorities are legitimate. Legitimacy
refers to the view held by employees that they are responsible
for obeying organizational rules—e.g., that the organization is
31

See Raymond Paternoster & Sally S. Simpson, Sanction Threats and
Appeals to Morality, 30 LAW & POL’Y 549, 549-84 (1996); TYLER, supra note 8;
COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 72-75; Tyler & Blader, supra note 30.
32
Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,
83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1281-1302 (1993); COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at
72-75; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 102-06 (2003).
33
See TRUMAN F. BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION
173-80 (1999).
34
See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of
Economics, 59 J. BUS. 5285 (1986).
35
See Albert Rees, The Role of Fairness in Wage Determination, 11 J. LABOR
ECON. 243, 243-53 (1993).
36
Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act,
18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19 (2000); Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law,
and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 47, 51 (2002).
37
Samuel Estreicher, Human Behavior and the Economic Paradigm at Work,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
38
Huselid, supra note 18, 635-72.; JOSHUA DANIEL MARGOLIS & JAMES
PATRICK WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS?: THE SEARCH FOR A LINK BETWEEN A
COMPANY’S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (2001).
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entitled to have its rules and policies obeyed. Although early
discussions of legitimacy, such as the work of Weber, focus on
the perceived legitimacy of government and law,39 it is clear
that legitimacy is also an important concept in the context of
work organizations.40 In work settings, legitimacy refers to the
judgment that “the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions.”41 If people feel that their
organization has legitimacy, they are motivated to defer to its
rules and policies.
The second ethical value is the belief held by employees
that corporate policies are congruent with their own personal
moral values. If employees believes that such value congruence
exists, they will be motivated by their own moral values to
follow corporate rules because they will see those rules as being
consistent with—and developed from—a set of moral values
with which they agree. Thus, they may follow rules in their
effort to do what they feel is morally right. For example, in
legal settings an important motivation that encourages people
to bring their behavior into line with the law is their belief that
many behaviors that are illegal are also immoral.42 Similar
moral values are found to shape cooperation within
experimental games.43 If people feel that their organization acts
in ways consistent with their own moral values, they are more
strongly motivated to support their organization.
Conversely, in situations in which employee behaviors
are contrary to official policy but viewed by people as not being
immoral—such as drug use, some sexual practices, and the
illegal use of copyrighted software—it is more difficult to bring
people’s behavior into conformity with the law. Employee theft
may be another behavior that violates corporate policy but that
is not viewed by employees as immoral when it is done to
restore the equities in the employee/employer relationship.
39

Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate with Organizations: An Identity-Based
Perspective, 21 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 201, 201-46 (1999).
40
See SELZNICK, supra note 5, at 139-43 (1969); Suchman, supra note 6, at
571-610.
41
See Suchman, supra note 6, at 571-610
42
See generally TYLER, supra note 8.
43
Norbert L. Kerr, Norms in Social Dilemmas, in SOCIAL DILEMMAS 31, 36-41
(David A. Schroeder ed., 1995); Norbert L. Kerr et al., That Still, Small Voice:
Commitment to Cooperate as an Internalized Versus a Social Norm, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1300, 1300-11 (1997); Nobert L. Kerr & C.M. Kaufman-Gilliland,
Communication, Commitment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 513-529 (1994).
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Similarly, employees in work organizations evaluate the
morality of company policies and practices and react to those
policies and practices in moral terms.44 Adherence to those
policies is more likely when they are viewed as morally
appropriate.
III.

ETHICAL VALUES AND WORKPLACE RULE ADHERENCE

The findings of recent research support the argument
that employees’ ethical values shape their behavior and, in
particular, their rule-following behavior. One example is
provided by Tyler and Blader,45 who reported two studies: one
of a sample of corporate bankers and another of a large and
diverse sample of American employees.46 Analysis of both
samples indicates that employee rule following and policy
adherence was strongly influenced by employees’ ethical
values.47 This included distinct influences of legitimacy and
moral-value congruence.48
These findings suggest that companies benefit by
fostering ethical values in their employees that support rule
following. Those ethical values serve as a major motivation for
employees to comply with company policies and rules and
consequently lead to lower levels of rule-breaking behavior on
the part of employees. These results suggest that one
promising way to bring the behavior of corporate employees
into line with corporate codes of conduct is to tap into their
ethical values. Because these values are central to the selfregulatory strategy for achieving employee compliance,
companies should activate employee values in order to gain
acceptance for corporate rules and policies.
Of course, the activation of employee values is not the
only way to influence rule-related behavior. Organizational
sanctions for rule-breaking may likewise motivate employees to
follow organizational policies, as suggested by the commandand-control model. However, in the two studies reported here,
the utility of that approach appears to be smaller in
magnitude. These findings suggest that companies have a
great deal to gain by going beyond instrumental strategies of
44
45
46
47
48

See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 31.
See Tyler & Blader, supra note 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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social control and focusing their attention on the activation of
employee values that are consistent with a self-regulatory
strategy. Overall, studies indicate that such a strategy is viable
and, furthermore, that this strategy is superior to the more
traditional command-and-control approach.49
The empirical support outlined above suggests the
utility of the self-regulatory strategy. Such an approach also
has benefits over a command-and-control strategy. For
instance, it prevents organizations from expending resources
on creating and maintaining credible systems of surveillance to
enforce rules. These enforcement problems are typical of any
efforts to regulate conduct using incentive or sanction-based
strategies. Even worse, such strategies actually encourage
people to hide their behavior and thus make it necessary to
have especially comprehensive and costly surveillance systems.
Besides their actual costs, an additional problem
associated with these strategies is that they undermine
employees’ commitment to their company and enjoyment of
their jobs. Employees’ intrinsic motivations and commitment to
their company is undermined when their focus is on avoiding
sanctions and, as a consequence,50 they contribute less to their
workplaces. Hence the downside to sanctions and the
surveillance associated with them is that these measures hurt
company productivity by undermining the ethical values that
encourage commitment to work.51
This is not to say that command-and-control systems
cannot work. They can, especially if organizations devote
sufficient resources to them. For example, some companies
engage in extensive monitoring, even putting cameras in
restrooms
and
monitoring
telephone
and
e-mail
communication. They may also try to create conditions under
which behavior is easily monitored by, for example, requiring
employees to time punch in and out of their workplace, to sign
out equipment or tools, or to work in publicly-accessible spaces.
Clearly, such efforts consume organizational resources. Even if
they work, these strategies are costly and inefficient.
The findings of the studies considered point to the
potential value of using the self-regulatory approach to
motivate employees. By activating employees’ own ethical
49
50
51

Id.
FREY, supra note 15, at 88-104.
See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 55-57.
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values, companies can gain willing cooperation from their
employees. By having people regulate themselves, such willing
cooperation becomes much more efficient and effective. In such
a model, employees take on the responsibility to follow rules
and undertake this responsibility without being concerned with
the likelihood of being caught and punished for wrongdoing.
In recent decades, it has become widely recognized that
self- regulation has value. Self-regulation is widely touted as a
means of lessening the costs of government regulatory agencies
and generally avoiding the problems that occur when
government seeks to regulate business.52 These same
arguments can be applied within companies. Companies
benefit when they can develop self-regulatory strategies that
encourage their employees to take increased responsibility for
rule following.
Earlier studies in the area of everyday law-related
behavior highlight the important role ethical values play in
encouraging citizens to comply with the law.53 It has been
shown that people are more likely to comply with laws when
they feel that legal authorities are legitimate and ought to be
obeyed. The findings noted support this argument and extend
it to a different arena—employees and their relationship to
their corporate employers. Recent corporate scandals have
highlighted the importance of understanding better how to
motivate employee compliance with corporate codes of conduct.
The influence of ethical judgments in these studies is
especially striking because the influence of ethical values in the
work arena has traditionally been downplayed in favor of
alternative instrumental or "rational" approaches. These
studies suggest that a model of motivation that only considers
rational motivations is incomplete and does not take account of
the important role that social motivations can play in shaping
employee rule-following behavior.
The current findings also extend previous work by
considering the social value of value congruence (i.e., the match
between the person’s moral values and those of the
organization) in addition to that of legitimacy. In other words,
people who experience justice when dealing with their work
52

See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1198-99 (1998); King & Lenox,
supra note 29, at 698-716; Gunningham & Rees, supra note 29, at 363-414; Aalders &
Wilthagen, supra note 6, at 415-43.
53
TYLER, supra note 8.
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organization first think that its rules are legitimate and ought
to be obeyed. They also feel that the values of their work
organization are more congruent with their own, so that their
own motivation to behave morally leads them to support their
work organization. Overall, these findings support the
argument that developing an appropriately ethical
organizational culture is central to the effectiveness and
viability of corporations.
It is especially striking that voluntary deference is
linked to ethical motivations. Organizations recognize that
they depend heavily on the good-will of employees who are
motivated to go beyond their job descriptions and to defer to
rules even when surveillance is weak. Such voluntary behavior
is central to organizational effectiveness and is strongly
motivated by legitimacy and moral congruence.
IV.

WORKPLACE POLICIES AND PRACTICES AND EMPLOYEE
ETHICAL VALUES

The self-regulatory model operates via the activation of
employees’ ethical values and feelings of responsibility toward
their company. The group engagement model54 hypothesizes
that factors such as employees’ ethical values are shaped by
employee perceptions of how fairly they are treated by
management. As has been noted, the potentially important role
of fairness in motivating positive work attitudes and behavior
has been recognized by economists as well as by social and
organizational psychologists. This approach is based upon a
psychological model suggesting that an organizational
environment characterized by fair procedures will activate
strong employee organizational identification, thus leading
employees to engage in desirable workplace behaviors and to
hold positive attitudes towards their work organizations.
Various aspects of an organization’s policies, human
resource practices, and culture may potentially influence
employee rule following and employee’s ethical values
regarding their work organizations. One set of management
theories argues that the primary organizational factor shaping
employees’ reactions to their work organizations is the
54

COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 16; Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L.
Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and
Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 349-61 (2003)
[hereinafter Group Engagement Model].
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distribution of outcomes in the work environment. According to
these theories, employee attitudes and behaviors are
responsive to judgments about the favorability of the outcomes
(i.e., resources) provided to them by corporate rules and
policies, as well as to the incentives and sanctions associated
with their workplace behavior. These arguments flow from an
instrumental model that views workers as motivated to
maximize the outcomes they receive from their work
organizations.
Psychological models of equity and distributive justice
also suggest that employees are instrumentally motivated and
focus on outcomes. The difference, though, is that these
psychological models focus on issues of distributive fairness.55
They suggest that employees are sensitive to whether or not
they feel that they are receiving a fair level of wages and
benefits. These models are premised on the idea that workers,
recognizing that people cannot have all they want,
subsequently form their judgments of whether they are
receiving their fair share of workplace resources according to
how they react towards their work organization .56
An alternative set of management theories argues that
employee reactions to their work organizations may be based
on their judgments about the fairness of the procedures used in
their workplace. Factors affecting these fairness judgments
may include, for example, whether the procedures allow
employees to have input into decision-making processes,
whether they require that objective information be used in
decision making, whether efforts are made to reduce biased
treatment, etc.57 Widespread evidence from all types of
organizations attests to the importance of procedural-fairness
judgments in shaping the behavior of employees in work
settings.58 Typical of this research is a study by Kim and
55

See J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 267-99 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965).
56
See ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 114-42
(1978).
57
See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of
Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 175-76 (1992)
[hereinafter Authority in Groups].
58
See J.A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCH.
425, 425-45 (2001); R. Cropanzano, Moral Virtues, Fairness Heuristics, Social Entities,
and Other Denizens of Organizational Justice, 58 J. VOCATIONAL PSYCH. 164, 164-209
(2001); ADVANCES IN ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE passim (Jerald Greenberg & Russell
Cropanzano eds., 2001); Authority in Groups, supra note 57, at 58; TOM R. TYLER ET AL.,
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Mauborgne that demonstrates that procedural-justice
evaluations influence the willingness of subsidiaries to accept
corporate strategic policy decisions in multinational work
organizations.59 Other studies link the fairness of workplace
procedures to employees’ willingness to help their work groups
voluntarily, to their intention to stay with their company, and
to the quality of their job performance.60
The procedural-justice argument is based upon the
belief that people’s procedural-justice judgments are distinct
from their instrumental concerns. That is, their reactions to
their judgments about the fairness of their organization’s
procedures is not related to goals they may have regarding the
outcomes that they receive from their organization. Instead,
they react to procedures because they make inferences about
their relational connections and social identities based on the
fairness of those procedures.61 These social-identity judgments
about issues such as their standing in the organization, the
status of the organization, and their level of identification with
the organization, in turn influence their work place attitudes
and behaviors.62 When organizational procedures are regarded
as fair, employees feel that they can safely identify with the
work organization and thus become engaged in it.63 This
approach is based on the idea that people are influenced by the
nature of the organizational environment in which they work
so that the “fit” between the practices of the organization and a
person’s impression of themselves (including their ethical
values) is important.64
The findings of procedural-justice research lead us to
hypothesize that procedural-justice judgments will impact: (1)
employees’ views about the legitimacy of corporate rules,
policies, and authorities, (2) employee perceptions that their
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).
59
See W.C. Kim & R.A. Mauborgne, Procedural Justice, Attitudes, and
Subsidiary Top Management Compliance with Multinationals’ Corporate Strategic
Decisions, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 502, 502-26 (1993).
60
See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 77-89.
61
See Authority in Groups, supra note 57, at 177.
62
See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 143-68; Tom R. Tyler &
Stephen L. Blader, Identity and Cooperative Behavior in Groups, 4 GROUP PROCESSES
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 207, 207-26 (2001); Tyler & Blader, supra note 30.
63
Tyler & Blader, supra note 30.
64
Jennifer A. Chatman, Improving Interactional Organizational Research: A
Model of Person-Organization Fit, 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 333, 333-49 (1989);
Jennifer A. Chatman, Matching People and Organizations: Selection and Socialization
in Public Accounting Firms, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q., 459, 459-84 (1991).
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organization’s values are consistent with their own, and (3)
employees’ rule-related behavior. In other words, fair
organizational procedures and processes are hypothesized to
foster a sense that corporate authorities are legitimate and
that the organization itself possesses moral values similar to
those of the individual. This activates employees’ own internal
motivations, and they follow company rules and policies more
voluntarily—i.e., they become self-regulating.
Note that this approach can be contrasted to one in
which employees’ ethical values are shaped by their
instrumental concerns. That is, the two instrumental
judgments discussed earlier—the favorability or fairness of
outcomes received from the organization—may shape the
extent to which corporate authorities are viewed as legitimate
and the organization itself is perceived as possessing moral
values similar to those of the individual. This would be the
prediction of instrumental models that emphasize the concern
employees have over the outcomes they receive.
We can consider the antecedents of employee ethical
values by investigating the relative influence of employees’
outcome judgments (such as outcome favorability and outcome
fairness) and procedural-justice judgments. The issue is which
of these judgments most strongly shape employee perceptions
that (1) organizational rules and authorities are legitimate,
and (2) that their personal moral values are consistent with
those of the organization. To the extent that employee ethical
values are linked to their rule-following behavior, this
investigation of the organizational antecedents of those
judgments is critical for encouraging employee adherence to
organizational policies.
The findings of studies conducted in work settings
suggest that one way that work organizations can motivate
their employees is by exercising authority in ways that will be
judged by those employees as fair. Tyler and Blader, for
example, find that procedural-justice judgments are the central
antecedent of rule following and policy adherence.65 Those
employees who feel that they work in a fair work environment
are especially willing to undertake personally the responsibility
to follow company policies, with the obvious advantage that the
company does not then have to compel such behavior. Studies
show that procedural-justice judgments have the potential to
65

See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 77-89.
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shape rule-related behavior, and that that influence is
primarily explained by the impact that procedural justice has
on ethical values. These findings support the arguments of the
group-engagement model, which suggests that cooperation is
linked to procedural-justice judgments.
These findings directly support the argument that fair
behavior on the part of management motivates desirable
behavior by employees. Hence, it is important for companies to
be concerned about acting in ways that employees will judge to
be fair. By acting fairly, companies motivate employees both to
follow company policies and refrain from engaging in actions
that undermine the company—actions ranging from theft to
sabotage. These actions are costly to the company, undermine
efficiency and effectiveness, and make clear why companies
should be motivated to understand and respond to employees’
feelings about what is fair.
Many organizations already recognize this strategy, and
act fairly toward their employees. The findings outlined here
indicate that these intuitions are correct and support the
wisdom of managing through fairness. Further, they support a
particular view about what type of fairness to be concerned
about. Both employees and researchers distinguish two forms
of fairness: distributive and procedural.66 Distributive fairness
is concerned with the fairness of a person’s outcomes, while
procedural justice is concerned about whether the decision is
made in a fair manner. In particular, however, these studies
indicate that it is primarily a procedurally-just workplace that
encourages ethical values and rule-following behavior.
Of course, companies are hierarchical, with rules and
policies flowing down from top levels of management. If upper
management does not itself support the value of rule following
and conformity to ethical codes of conduct, as appears to have
been the case in the recent Enron scandal, then the motivation
to create a supportive corporate culture may not exist among
managers. Knowing how to create an ethical culture will be
unimportant in that case since upper management will not be
motivated to act toward the objective. Further, employees are
likely to become aware that company policies are not aligned
with their own moral values and they will become less
committed to following company rules and policies.

66

See TYLER ET AL., supra note 58.
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In a situation of this type, the effectiveness of regulation
falls on the ethical values of semiautonomous groups, such as
external lawyers or accountants, whose ethical values may
have been activated by their own organizations, and/or to
government regulators, who again may be motivated by their
own ethical concerns. Or it is shaped by the law and legal
institutions through the policies they adopt for dealing with
businesses and the people within them.
These findings have optimistic implications for the
ability of organizational authorities to encourage rule-following
behavior among their employees. Authorities are seldom in the
position to expend excessive organizational resources on
monitoring and punishing employee misbehavior. The
procedural-justice perspective suggests that people will comply
with and, more strikingly, voluntarily defer to rules when they
feel that their organization’s rule-making authorities are
following fair procedures when they exercise their authority
and make managerial decisions. This strategy similarly
promotes the view amongst employees that organizational
authorities are legitimate and that the moral values of the
organization correspond with their own personal moral values.
From an organizational point of view, what makes such a
finding optimistic is that the creation and implementation of
procedures that all individuals perceive as fair is not restricted
in the same way that allocations of resources are. Procedural
fairness is not finite, particularly since it is based on ethical
criteria.
Interestingly, the procedural-justice perspective is
consistent with emerging trends in law and the legal regulation
of business. As command-and-control based strategies of
regulation have increasingly been questioned, government
regulatory agencies have developed a variety of strategies for
enlisting businesses and other “stakeholders” in the
formulation and implementation of regulatory policy. These
include negotiation to reach consensus on administrative
regulations,67 cooperative arrangements for delivering social
services,68 and joint efforts to manage wildlife and wildlands.69
67

See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1264-66 (1997).
68
st
See Stewart, R.B. Administrative law in the 21 century. Presentation at
the New York University Law School. (February 10, 2003).
69
See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 190, 240-42 (2002).
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These policies decentralize power to “enable citizens and other
actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their
individual circumstances.”70 All of these efforts involve
procedures for decision making that embody the proceduraljustice values of voice, participation, neutrality, and
acknowledging the rights, needs and concerns of people
involved in the decision. This does not mean that they involve
wide employee participation, but rather that they reflect the
values inherent in procedural-justice perspectives on
management.
V.

WHAT IS A FAIR PROCEDURE?

From a management perspective, procedural-justice
judgments are most useful to managers if employees
distinguish them from outcome judgments and rely on distinct
procedural-justice assessments when evaluating the actions of
management. Based upon research in work settings, I argue
that employees' views about the fairness of corporate
procedures are, in fact, heavily influenced by distinct
judgments about procedural fairness that are not linked to the
favorability or fairness of the outcomes that results from those
procedures.71 These include, for example, whether the
procedures allow employees to have input into evaluations,
whether they require that objective information be used,
whether they try to control the influence of bias, etc.72 Recent
research draws upon the four-component model of procedural
justice and tests the importance of four potential proceduraljustice criteria.73
Understanding the nature of employees’ procedural
justice judgments is central to efforts to design a corporate
culture that encourages supportive employee values and that
enhances employee rule-following behavior. The argument
advanced here is that the potential impact of these procedural
issues lies in the ability of corporations to design systems of
management that are sensitive to employee procedural
concerns even when companies cannot or do not provide
workers with the outcomes they desire.
70

See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998).
71
See COOPERATION IN GROUPS, supra note 7, at 77-89.
72
See Authority in Groups, supra note 57, at 175-76.
73
See Group Engagement Model, supra note 54, at 349-61.
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The four-component model of procedural justice
identifies four procedural components, or evaluations, each of
which contributes to overall procedural-justice judgments.
Those components are defined by: (1) two distinct aspects of
organizational processes and (2) two sources of information
about procedures. I will discuss the influence of each of these
four components on employee definitions of procedural justice.
One of the aspects of organizational processes
considered in the model refers to the organization’s decisionmaking procedures. Specifically, the model considers
employees’ evaluations of the quality of decision making in
their organization. Consideration of these evaluations links to
the elements of legal procedures and emphasizes issues of
decision-maker neutrality, the objectivity and factuality of
decision making, and the consistency of rule application.74
There is a distinct, but potentially equally important
issue involving the quality of people's treatment by
organizational authorities. Quality of interpersonal treatment
issues constitute the second aspect of organizational processes.
Quality of treatment involves treatment with politeness and
dignity, concern for people's rights, and other aspects of
procedures that are not directly linked to the decisions being
made through the procedure.
Each of these two aspects of procedures (quality of
decision making, quality of treatment) can potentially be linked
to two sources of procedure. One source of information involves
the rules of the organization. The formal rules and structures of
the organization, as well as statements of organizational
values, communicate information about organizational
procedures. For example, organizations vary in terms of
whether they have formal grievance procedures that allow
people to voice complaints. They also differ in their statements
of corporate values (“corporate vision statements”). For
example, one common formal organizational statement that
concerns relationships among employees is to “[t]reat each
other with respect, dignity, and common courtesy” and “express
disagreements openly and respectfully.” These are both
statements about the type of procedures that the corporation
views as reflecting its values.
The other source of information is an employee's
experience with his or her supervisor or supervisors. While they
74

See generally Authority in Groups, supra note 57.
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are constrained by formal institutions and procedures,
organizational authorities typically have considerable
discretion concerning the manner in which they implement
decision-making procedures and how they make decisions
regarding issues that have no formal procedures associated
with them. Further, they have a great deal of flexibility about
how they treat those with whom they deal. The same decisionmaking procedure can be implemented either in a way that
emphasizes the dignity of those involved or in a manner that
treats employees rudely or dismissively. A similar situation is
found within the law. While there are formal laws and rules
constraining the conduct of police officers and judges, those
authorities typically have considerable latitude when
exercising their authority within the framework of those rules.
The four-component model argues that each of the four
components defined by these two dimensions has an important
role in the definition of the fairness of procedures. While the
four-component model provides a guideline for the types of
evaluations that compose overall evaluations of an
organization’s procedural justice, the essential argument
advanced here is that the nature of those evaluations is noninstrumental and non-material. Neither of the aspects of
organizational processes emphasized in this model of the
antecedents of procedural justice (quality of decision making,
quality of treatment) is directly linked to evaluations of the
favorability or fairness of the outcomes people receive.
The four-component model highlights a set of procedural
criteria that are distinct from judgments about the favorability
or fairness of employees’ outcomes. This is, of course, typical of
procedures in any type of organization. We can, for example,
distinguish the adversary trial procedure from the verdict of
the trial and can contrast that procedure with other ways of
making decisions, such as the inquisitorial trial procedure.
Four criteria of procedural justice are typically
measured in studies of work settings: organizational-level
quality of decision making, organizational-level quality of
treatment, supervisor-level quality of decision making, and
supervisor-level quality of treatment. Procedural criteria linked
to supervisors, rather than organizational rules, are viewed
more positively. That is, employees viewed their supervisors as
using fair procedures when implementing organizational
policies that they generally viewed as being unfair.
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CONCLUSION

The argument advanced here is in support of a broader
view of the employee and of the antecedents of rule-following
behavior among employees. We want to articulate and show
the importance of a broader and more complete picture of the
motivation of employees in work settings. This model looks at
the influence of both instrumental and value-based motivations
in shaping rule-following behavior. The results presented
suggest that such behavior is best explained when both types of
motivation are considered together than when either model is
taken alone.
The view presented here includes not only the
motivations traditionally studied—motivations that are linked
to sanctions—but also includes ethical motivations for
following group rules. These ethical motivations are linked to
concerns about acting in ethical and fair ways in work settings.
The case for this broader model rests on the finding that
corporate actors are motivated in their rule following by their
ethical values concerning legitimacy and morality, their
judgments about the procedural fairness of their workplace,
and by their assessments of process aspects of procedures.
These findings suggest that we would be better able to
understand rule-following behavior in work organizations, as
well as other settings, if we adopted a broader model of human
motivation that added an account of ethical motivations to our
models of employee behavior.
The results outlined suggest that one promising
approach to stopping employee misbehavior, and thus the
recent wave of corporate scandals that have dominated the
business press, is to emphasize the ability of appropriate work
cultures to motivate employees to act based upon their feelings
of responsibility and obligation to both company codes of
conduct and to their own personal feelings of morality.
Encouraging such motivations leads to an enhanced likelihood
that companies can bring their own behavior into line with
their internal principles, as well as formal laws and
government regulations, even in the absence of government
and corporate regulation.

